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Abstract 
 
This paper speaks to the classic view that mental health requires accurate self-perception. 
Using a representative British sample (N = 1,601) it finds that, as measured by two 
established well-being indicators, those with mistaken expectations, whether optimistic or 
pessimistic, do worse than realists. We index unrealistic optimism as the difference between 
financial expectations and financial realizations measured annually over 18 years. The effects 
are not small, with those holding the most pessimistic (optimistic) expectations experiencing 
a 21.8% (13.5%) reduction in long-run well-being. These findings may result from the 
decision errors and counteracting emotions associated with holding biased beliefs. For 
optimists, disappointment may eventually dominate the anticipatory feelings of expecting the 
best whilst for pessimists the depressing effect of expecting doom may eventually dominate 
the elation when the worst is avoided. Also, plans based on inaccurate beliefs are bound to 
deliver worse outcomes than would rational expectations. 
 
Keywords: Unrealistic Optimism; Well-Being; Decision Making; Loss Aversion; 
Disappointment Aversion. 
  
“Pessimism is, in brief, playing the sure game. You cannot lose at it; you may gain. It is the 
only view of life in which you can never be disappointed. Having reckoned what to do in the 
worst possible circumstances, when better arise, as they may, life becomes child's play.” - 
Thomas Hardy 
 
“...that sanguine expectation of happiness which is happiness itself.” - Jane Austen, Sense 
and Sensibility 
 
Introduction 
 
Is it best to expect the best? Research into dispositional optimism—generalized 
outcome expectancies that good things will happen (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994)—
finds that positive beliefs are fundamental for a variety of different positive psychological 
and physical health-relevant outcomes (Scheier & Carver, 1987, 1992, 1993). Here, positive 
beliefs are advantageous, as those with an optimistic disposition are thought to be able to 
cope in a more adaptive way to stressful situations (Scheier & Carver, 1993). However, 
demonstrating the benefits of dispositional optimism is not straightforward. Finding that 
positive beliefs are associated with higher well-being may partly reflect the realistic 
expectation of people likely to have positive experiences. This problem is eliminated by 
examining how beliefs affect well-being controlling for outcomes. That is, adopting the 
alternate psychological perspective of unrealistic optimism. Here, optimism is viewed as a 
preponderance towards positive forecasting errors or, more formally, as the tendency to 
overestimate the likelihood of positive events, and underestimate the likelihood of negative 
events (Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein & Klein, 1996). Unrealistic optimism has been found to 
be one of the most pervasive human traits, with studies consistently reporting that a large 
majority of the population (about 80% according to most estimates) display an optimism bias 
(Sharot, 2011). The bias tends to be highest when events are perceived to be under the 
individual’s control (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), that is, when outcomes can be 
influenced through effort or ingenuity (Harris, Griffin, & Murray, 2008). However, 
unrealistic optimism has also been documented for purely chance events (Langer & Roth, 
1975). Despite the prevalent tendency for humans to make systematically biased probability 
assessments, there is still considerable debate within psychology and economics as to 
whether such beliefs are aligned with psychological well-being. 
There is evidence that unrealistic optimism comes with costs as well as benefits. On 
the downside, when expectations are not fulfilled, a variety of negative emotions are 
triggered (Diener, Colvin, Pavot, & Allman, 1991) including disappointment (Bell, 1985). 
Even when expectations are fulfilled, there is the loss of the elation that might otherwise be 
experienced. In general, optimistic beliefs reduce the pleasure from realized outcomes as the 
emotions derived from outcomes are determined in part by counterfactual thinking—good 
outcomes are more pleasing when they are unexpected, and negative outcomes feel less 
disappointing when they are expected (Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Mellers, 
Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Shepperd & McNulty, 2002; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2010). For 
example, Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan, and Dolan (2014) find that momentary happiness 
depends on whether a gamble does better than its objectively expected value. In general, 
happiness is not determined by how well things are going, but whether they are going better 
than expected. Amongst many illustrations of this, McGraw, Mellers, and Ritov (2004) 
reported that the most confident basketball players experienced less enjoyment from 
successful shots and more pain from failed shots.  
Loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) —the tendency to feel more pain when 
experiencing losses than pleasure from equal gains—also implies that optimism has a cost. 
The utility of an income realization depends on how it compares to a reference level, 
identified by Koszegi and Rabin (2006) as expected income. As falling short of the reference 
has greater cost than the gain of exceeding it, the implication is that the high reference point 
of optimists makes them worse off than pessimists. 
Unrealistic optimism also has benefits. A substantial body of research has 
documented that positive illusions about the self—unrealistically positive self-evaluations, 
exaggerated perceptions of control, and unrealistic optimism—are characteristics that bring 
about and maintain psychological well-being (Alloy & Ahrens, 1987; Pyszczynski, Holt, & 
Greenberg, 1987; Taylor & Brown, 1988).1 The ability to feel good about oneself may be 
useful when encountering negative feedback or stressful events (Taylor & Brown, 1988). It 
could also be that human cognition acts in a way more aligned to the philosophy ignorance is 
bliss.  
There is also considerable evidence that individuals derive pleasure and pain directly 
from their beliefs. Loewenstein (1987) argued that most people regularly experience 
emotions related to anticipation, with the expectation of favorable outcomes having an impact 
on immediate well-being. Experimental evidence by Berns et al. (2006) found that being told 
about an impending electric shock was a direct source of misery. Indeed, Lazarus (1966) 
documented that certain forms of physical pain have no impact on psychological stress over 
and above that produced by the anticipation of physical pain. That people derive pleasure 
from positive beliefs and anxiety from negative beliefs, suggests that individuals can be 
motivated to maintain an optimistic view of themselves and their future (Brunnermeier & 
Parker, 2005; Sharot & Garrett, 2016). 
Misperceptions thus have advantages and disadvantages. Realism also has its 
advocates. There is a long tradition in Western thought, as inscribed in the temple at Delphi, 
that to “know thyself” is the right maxim to live by. It is a theme echoed by mid-century 
humanistic psychology. For instance, Maslow takes the view that “healthy individuals find it 
possible to accept themselves and their own nature without chagrin or complaint” (1950, 
p.155) and Rogers “psychotherapy …is a process whereby man becomes his organism-
without self-deception without distortion” (1961, p.103). In a review of the dominant views 
of mental health at the time, Jahoda concluded that the mentally healthy person was someone 
“able to take matters one wishes were different, without distorting them to fit these wishes—
that is, without inventing cues not actually existing” (1958, p.51) and that “the perception of 
reality is called mentally healthy when what the individual sees corresponds to what is 
actually there” (1958, p.6). Denial may provide temporary relief from stress and anxiety but 
in the longer run you have to live in the world as it is not as you would like it to be. Failure to 
recognise this will lead to stressful dissonance and poor decision making. Denial is at most a 
first step in a healthy response to a shock such as personal loss, a process that must eventually 
end with acceptance (Kübler-Ross, 1969).  
For mainstream economists, contact with reality and unbiased assessments of 
probabilities are traditionally viewed as being beneficial. According to this perspective,  
decisions based on accurate, objective and unbiased evidence must maximize expected 
utility.2 Unrealistic optimism, like any judgemental bias, distorts the decision making 
process, leading to sub-optimal outcomes and lower well-being. Faulty assessments do not 
only result in systematic decision errors, but also lead to rash behaviour (de Meza, Dawson, 
Henley, & Arabsheibani, 2019) and inadequate precautionary measures (Dillard, Midboe, & 
Klein, 2009). 
The long-term consequences of optimism on well-being are therefore ambiguous. 
Depending upon the intensity of anticipatory emotions, loss aversion and the costs of 
distorted decision making, optimistic, pessimistic or even realistic beliefs could emerge as 
utility maximising. In fact, as we have shown above, the evolving paradigms in psychology 
and economics have at some point argued in favour of each type of belief as being 
fundamental to contentment. More than this, whether optimism is beneficial, harmful or 
neutral may depend on its level. For instance, whilst a little bit of optimism may be 
beneficial, extreme standings on potentially “desirable” personality traits might be 
maladaptive (Carter, Miller, & Widiger, 2018). Thus, for optimism, more may not always be 
better—the benefits of extra optimism may be diminishing and the costs increasing.  
As it is not possible to sign the effect of biased beliefs on well-being from theoretical 
considerations alone, there is a need for evidence. This paper uses a large and lengthy 
longitudinal survey to establish whether, taking everything into account, it is unrealistic 
optimists, unrealistic pessimists or realists that have the highest long-run well-being. It is 
quite rare to be able to measure forecasting errors on a repeated basis. This we can do, but 
only in one domain, household finances. Whether being unrealistically optimistic about 
financial prospects is correlated with unrealistic optimism in other non-financial domains 
remains an open question. Though we have some arguments that unrealistic optimism is 
likely to be domain-general, all we can rigorously claim is that realism over financial 
forecasts is associated with higher well-being, measured by life satisfaction and 
psychological distress, than is unrealistic optimism or pessimism. 
 
Method 
Participants  
The data used for analysis is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 1991-2009 
(Waves 1-18). The BHPS is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of more than 
5,000 households (comprising approximately 12,000 individuals) which began in 1991, 
funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council as a national and international 
multi-purpose research resource. The questionnaire instrument includes a household 
questionnaire and a lengthy individual questionnaire covering a range of topics including 
household composition, demographic characteristics, economic activity, health and finances. 
The sample used for the subsequent analysis is restricted to the original BHPS sample 
covering Great Britain and to individuals who were observed in all 18 waves and gave valid 
responses to the dependent and independent variables used in the subsequent analysis. This 
yields a balanced panel of 1,601 individuals.  
Measures 
Optimism. By optimism, we do not mean a belief that good things will happen. Such 
a belief may be justified, making it impossible to distinguish biased from realistic 
expectations. It is unrealistic optimism that we are concerned with. That is, an excessive 
belief in the probability of good realizations and therefore a preponderance of positive 
forecast errors. Various methodological approaches have been used to assess the extent of 
unrealistic optimism in the population. One major problem faced by these studies is the 
difficulty in determining the objective probabilities against which expectations should be 
compared. In many cases the average probability (risk) of the population is used as an 
objective probability, which can lead to individuals frequently being misclassified as 
unrealistically optimistic. For instance, a man who assesses his risk of bowel cancer at 2% 
could be classed as optimistic, when we consider the risk for men in general is much higher. 
However, this may not imply bias. Some people are objectively less (more) likely to 
experience bad (good) events. Hence, for optimism to be unrealistic, predictions need to be 
compared with later experiences or statistically derived true expected values (Coelho, 2010; 
Weinstein & Klein, 1996). This is the approach we adopt in our empirical analysis, by 
utilizing two questions asked in every wave of the BHPS. Firstly, the BHPS asks individuals 
‘Looking ahead, how do you think you yourself will be financially a year from now; better 
than you are now, worse than you are now, or about the same?’ It also asks ‘Would you say 
that you yourself are better off, worse off or about the same financially than you were a year 
ago?’ 3 Comparing financial expectations at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 (of 𝑡 + 1) with the financial realization 
at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 + 1 over the 18 waves, provides the basis for measuring optimism. What subjects 
understand by being “better off” or “worse off” financially is not straightforward. A further 
question asks subjects to attribute the main reason for why their financial situation changed. 
For those who were financially “better off”, 57% report that an income increase is the main 
reason, followed by 15% who report a fall in expenditures. For those who were financially 
“worse off”, 50% report that the reason is higher expenditures, whereas 28% report lower 
income. In judging unrealistic optimism, it is not obviously the source of the change in 
finances which is relevant. What matters is that individuals who reported a financial change, 
objectively experienced that change. Using the same data source as us, Brown and Taylor 
(2006) check how consistent intertemporal judgements of change in financial situation are 
with  actual changes in real and nominal income, with the latter calculated from the 
difference in reports of income level one year to the next (i.e., 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡). The results 
reassuringly report consistency between the two measures, suggesting that individual 
perceptions square with what happens to actual finances.4 
Responses to the financial expectation and realization questions are both assessed on a 
three-point scale (from -1 to +1) ranging from “worse off” to “better off”. Measured 
discrepancies between expectations and realizations in a particular time period can be 
decomposed into a permanent component reflecting a systematic psychological bias—a stable 
individual trait associated with generally biased expectations— and a transitory component 
reflecting random shocks to realizations and random errors of evaluation. As it is the effects 
of the psychological component that we are concerned with, transitory optimism is 
minimized by constructing for each individual, 𝑖, a time-averaged expectation (𝐸ത௜) and 
realization variable (𝑅ത௜) over the available data (for a scatterplot of 𝐸ത௜ and 𝑅ത௜, see Figure S1 
in the Supplemental Material). From these variables we can also construct a scale (from -2 to 
+2) of financial forecast error, 𝐹𝐸തതതത௜ = 𝐸ത௜ − 𝑅ത௜. Here, positive forecast errors (i.e. scores above 
zero) are associated with optimistic beliefs and negative forecast errors with pessimistic 
beliefs. 
 Well-being. Psychological well-being is captured by responses to the 12-item General 
Health Questionnaire (GHQ) and to a question on life satisfaction (LS). The GHQ is carried 
out in every wave of the BHPS and is a widely applied measure and arguably one of the most 
reliable indicators of psychological distress or ‘disutility’ (Argyle, 1989). Moreover, the 
GHQ in the BHPS has been shown to be robust to retest effects making it highly suitable for 
longitudinal analysis (Pevalin, 2000). We use the Likert scoring method, where responses to 
the 12-items are coded on a 4 point (items scored 0-1-2-3) scoring system that ranges from a 
‘disagree strongly’ to ‘agree strongly’. Scores are then summed together, providing a total 
GHQ score ranging from 0 to 36, with higher scores corresponding to lower psychological 
well-being or higher ‘disutility’. An alternative scoring method is the ‘Caseness’ scoring 
method, which sums the number of times the respondent places themselves in the fairly 
stressed or highly stressed category (items scored 0-0-1-1), providing a total GHQ score 
ranging from 0 to 12. However, Banks et al. (1980) suggest that the Likert method is to be 
preferred to the ‘Caseness’ method in studies using parametric multivariate techniques, since 
its distribution more closely approximates the normal. Nevertheless, all the results presented 
in the subsequent analysis are robust to the ‘Caseness’ method. 
Responses to the life satisfaction (LS) question are given on a 7-point Likert scale, 
where respondents were asked in waves 6–10 and 12–18 “How dissatisfied or satisfied are 
you with your life overall?” ranging from “not satisfied at all” to “completely satisfied.” Life 
satisfaction is commonly used by psychologists and sociologists as a measure of an 
individual’s psychological state and has been shown to be strongly correlated with other 
survey instruments designed to capture subjective well-being (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 
1999). For each individual, 𝑖, we construct a time-averaged measure of well-being, 𝑊ഥ௜
௝, for 
well-being measure 𝑗 = (𝐺𝐻𝑄, 𝐿𝑆) over the available data (for the full distribution of these 
two well-being variables, see Figure S2 in the Supplemental Material).   
Demographic characteristics. A number of other variables may explain the 
correlation between well-being and financial expectations and realizations. As covariates we 
include a control for gender and a range of individual time-averaged socioeconomic and 
sociodemographic controls. These control variables are age (in linear form); marital status; 
the number of dependent children in the household; economic activity; educational 
attainment; housing tenure; logged monthly household income (deflated); number of 
cigarettes smoked and region of residence. All these controls have been shown to be strong 
predictors of subjective well-being (Dolan, Peasgood, & White, 2008; Kahneman & Krueger, 
2006). 
Table S1 in the Supplemental Material presents summary statistics for our time-
averaged demographic characteristics and our time-averaged measures of expectations, 
realizations, forecast errors and psychological well-being. Consistent with much of the 
literature, financial expectations exceed realizations, therefore our sample is on average 
optimistic. This is confirmed by our financial forecast error variable, where the mean exceeds 
zero. Mean GHQ is 10.90 and mean life satisfaction is 5.33. The mean age is approximately 
48 years. Just under 55% of the sample are female and 13% report holding a university or 
college degree.  
 
Analytic Strategy 
As we have argued, expectations have multiple opposing effects on well-being and 
these effects may not be linear. This raises the possibility that the relation between 
expectations and well-being is not monotonic. We therefore need a functional form that is 
sufficiently flexible to capture this property. Specifically, we need to 1) allow expectations 
and realizations to separately influence well-being, 2) allow relationships to be potentially 
non-linear and, 3) allow for the effect of expectations on well-being to depend on the level of 
realization. A flexible form that can handle all these possibilities and is easily estimated is the 
general second-degree polynomial. Using between-person variation, we estimate the 
following equation using Ordinary Least Squares (to simplify, we omitted all control 
variables from the notation):      
𝑊ഥ௜
௝ = 𝑏଴ + 𝑏ଵ𝐸ത௜ + 𝑏ଶ𝑅ത௜ + 𝑏ଷ𝐸ത௜ଶ + 𝑏ସ𝑅ത௜ଶ + 𝑏ହ(𝐸ത௜ × 𝑅ത௜) + 𝑒௜ (1) 
where 𝑊ഥ௜
௝ is our time-averaged measure of well-being, for individual, 𝑖, and well-being 
measure 𝑗 = (𝐺𝐻𝑄, 𝐿𝑆). Our five individual time-averaged polynomial terms are: 𝑏ଵ𝐸ത௜ 
(expectations), 𝑏ଶ𝑅ത௜ (realizations),  𝑏ଷ𝐸ത௜ଶ (expectations × expectations), 𝑏ସ𝑅ത௜ଶ (realizations × 
realizations) and, 𝑏ହ(𝐸ത௜ × 𝑅ത௜) (expectations × realizations). Here, 𝑏ଷ and 𝑏ସ capture any non-
linear effects of expectations and realizations on well-being, respectively. If the effect of 
expectations on well-being differ by the level of realizations this is measured by 𝑏ହ.  
Equation (1) embodies a between-person approach. Instead, a within-person 
estimation could be undertaken. Here, the well-being of individual 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is dependent on 
an individual fixed effect, 𝑎௜, and on 𝑅௜௧ , 𝐸௜௧, 𝐸௜௧ିଵ. The problem is that if optimism is a stable 
individual characteristic, the effect of optimism on well-being cannot be captured by a 
within-person approach any more than could the effect of say, gender on well-being. To the 
extent to which optimism is a stable trait, the within-person equation only measures the effect 
of random fluctuations in realizations and changes in expectations caused by either random 
errors of evaluation or updating in light of new circumstances. It does not provide a way to 
draw a conclusion about how within-person changes in optimism, if they occur, affect well-
being.5 
Results 
We begin by examining the results from our second-degree polynomial equation with 
the full set of control variables included. We then examine the results from a special case of 
our second-degree polynomial equation, which includes the forecast error variable directly. 
We then investigate the robustness of our results by estimating the equations across all 
possible combinations of our control variables. Lastly, we investigate whether biased beliefs 
may be correlated with some personality feature that is incompatible with well-being.  
It is worth reiterating before we discuss our results, that lower GHQ scores represent 
higher well-being whereas the opposite is true for our life satisfaction score. Table 1 displays 
the results of the second-degree polynomial analysis. Here, we see that the three second-
degree polynomial terms—that is, 𝐸ത௜ଶ, 𝑅ത௜ଶ and 𝐸ത௜ × 𝑅ത௜—were jointly significant in predicting 
GHQ, 𝐹(3, 1565) = 5.02, 𝑝 < .001; and life satisfaction 𝐹(3, 1565) = 8.75, 𝑝 < .001. 
Regression 1 of Table 1 displays that the quadratic relationship between expectations and 
GHQ is highly statistically significant (𝑏 = 2.66, 95% confidence interval, or CI =
[1.12, 4.20], 𝑡 = 3.39, 𝑝 = .001). Regression 2 of Table 1 displays that this is also the case 
for life satisfaction (𝑏 = −0.95, 95% CI = [−1.36, −0.54], 𝑡 = −4.56, 𝑝 < .001). 
Moreover, in both Regressions 1 and 2 of Table 1, the effect of expectations on well-being 
differs by the level of realizations (Regression 1: 𝑏 = −4.18, 95% CI = [−6.46, −1.91], 𝑡 =
−3.60, 𝑝 < .001; Regression 2: 𝑏 = 0.86, 95% CI = [0.26, 1.47], 𝑡 = 2.79, 𝑝 = .005). These 
results together suggest that our second-degree polynomial fits the data well and importantly, 
that the relationship between expectations and well-being is non-linear and depends upon the 
level of the realization. 
The key results of the second-degree polynomial equation are summarized in the 
contour maps presented in Figures 1 and 2, which are useful for graphically illustrating 
complex nonlinear functions. In each of the figures, the y-axis and x-axis contain the 
predictor variables, expectations (𝐸ത௜) and realizations (𝑅ത௜), respectively. The z-axis in each 
case represents colored contour bands, representing ranges of the predicted levels of the 
response variable, psychological well-being (𝑊ഥ௜
௝). In each figure, a 45-degree diagonal line, 
originating from the origin (𝐸ത௜ = 𝑅ത௜) would represent those with realistic beliefs, whilst the 
top left and bottom right of each diagram represents those with the most optimistic beliefs 
and pessimistic beliefs, respectively. In both the GHQ and life satisfaction contour maps, 
given realizations, peak well-being tends to be located around the imaginary 45-degree line, 
with well-being falling away as expectations vary in optimistic and pessimistic directions. It 
seems reasonable that an equi-proportional increase in realizations and expectations should 
boost well-being. Reflecting this, psychological well-being increases as we move from 
realistic beliefs associated with low levels of expectations and realizations to realistic beliefs 
associated with high levels of expectations and realizations.  
In summary, the main results are similar whether well-being is measured by GHQ or 
by life satisfaction. Given realizations, those holding realistic beliefs are best off.  
An alternative approach to displaying the results from our second-degree polynomial 
equations is to plot how expectations affect GHQ and life satisfaction for a given level of 
realization. In the top panels of Figure 3, we display the estimated quadratic relationship 
between expectations and psychological well-being, evaluated at a realization of zero. 
Therefore, if realistic beliefs are optimal for well-being, we expect a turning point to emerge 
where expectations approach zero. The top panels of Figure 3 confirm that this turning point 
emerges for both the GHQ and life satisfaction measures of well-being. The 95% confidence 
intervals for the turning points are well within the observed range of expectations, so we can 
be confident that reasonably realistic beliefs are associated with the highest well-being. 
Within the top panels of Figure 3, we also include as bar charts the slope estimates 
(derivative) of the quadratic relationship between expectations and psychological well-being, 
with the 95% confidence intervals included. These estimates illustrate that the positive and 
negative slopes of the quadratic relationship are both significantly different from zero. The 
effect of misperceptions are not small. Specifically, those with the most pessimistic 
(optimistic) expectations are associated with a 37.2% (11.8%) higher level of GHQ, than 
those with the most realistic beliefs. The equivalent effects for life satisfaction is that those 
with the most pessimistic (optimistic) expectations experience a 21.8% (13.5%) reduction in 
well-being. Conclusions are similar when the effect of expectations on psychological well-
being is evaluated at other values of the realization.  
Next, we examine the effects of mistaken expectations on well-being by means of a 
special case of our second-degree polynomial equation. Specifically, we conduct a multiple 
regression in which forecasting errors (𝐹𝐸തതതത௜ = 𝐸ത௜ − 𝑅ത௜) and realizations (𝑅ത௜) were entered as 
predictors of psychological well-being. To determine whether realistic beliefs are optimal for 
well-being, forecasting errors is entered in a quadratic form. In other words, we estimated the 
following equation using Ordinary Least Squares (to simplify, we again omit all control 
variables from the notation):      
𝑊ഥ௜
௝ = 𝑐଴ + 𝑐ଵ𝐹𝐸തതതത௜ + 𝑐ଶ𝐹𝐸തതതത௜ଶ + 𝑐ଷ𝑅ത௜ + 𝑒௜ (2) 
 
Although this is a restricted form of our second-degree polynomial equation, it is a 
natural formulation and easily interpretable.6 Table 2 displays the results. Regression 1 of 
Table 2 shows that the quadratic relationship between forecasting errors and GHQ is highly 
statistically significant (𝑏 = 2.12, 95% CI = [1.01, 3.23], 𝑡 = 3.75, 𝑝 < .001). Regression 2 
of Table 2 displays that this is also the case for life satisfaction (𝑏 = −0.54, 95% CI =
[−0.84, −0.25], 𝑡 = −3.59, 𝑝 < .001). In the bottom panels of Figure 3, we display the 
predicted quadratic relationship between forecasting errors and psychological well-being. If 
realistic beliefs are optimal for well-being, we expect a turning point to emerge where the 
forecast error approaches zero. The bottom panels of Figure 3 confirm that this turning point 
emerges for both the GHQ and life satisfaction measures of well-being with 95% confidence 
intervals for the turning points indicating that we can again be confident in concluding that 
reasonably realistic beliefs are associated with the highest well-being. Within the bottom 
panels of Figure 3, we also include as bar charts the slope estimates (derivative) of the 
quadratic relationship between forecasting errors and psychological well-being, with the 95% 
confidence intervals included. These estimates illustrate that the positive and negative slopes 
of the quadratic relationship are both significantly different from zero. Again, these effects 
are not small. A one-point increase in forecast error from those with realistic beliefs, 
increases GHQ by 8.9% and reduces life satisfaction by 8.5%. The equivalent comparison 
when moving in the pessimistic direction generates an increase in GHQ of 30.2% and a 
reduction in life satisfaction of 11.7%. 
Next, we investigate the robustness of our coeffcient estimates by conducting our 
analysis across all possible combinations of our control variables (Young & Holsteen, 2017). 
Table S2 and S3 in the Supplemental Material reports regressions with the same 
specifications as in Table 1 and 2, but where the reporting of statistics reflects the mean 
estimates from the 1,024 unique combinations of control variables. These tests illustrate that 
our results are strongly robust to model specification and, as such, not dependent on knife-
edge specifications. Lastly, we investigate an interesting possibility, which is that extreme 
beliefs may be correlated with some personality feature that is incompatible with well-being. 
In Wave 15 of our data, we have available the short 15-item Big-Five inventory (BFI-15). 
Table S4 and S5 in the Supplemental Material reports regressions with the same 
specifications as in Table 1 and 2, but adding controls for conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, openness, neuroticism. In summary, consistent with previous studies 
personality type is important for well-being (Hayes & Joseph, 2003), this however does not 
explain the relationship between our well-being measures and optimism. Reasonably realistic 
beliefs are still associated with the highest well-being (for a graphical representation of these 
results, see Figure S3 in the Supplemental Material) 
 
Discussion 
 
This paper finds that long-run well-being is higher for realists—those who exhibit 
long-run accuracy in forecasting their financial outcomes—than for either optimists or 
pessimists. These effects are not small. Compared to realists, those with the most pessimistic 
(optimistic) expectations have a 37.2% (11.8%) higher level of psychological distress. For 
life satisfaction, those holding the most pessimistic (optimistic) expectations are associated 
with a 21.8% (13.5%) reduction in well-being when compared to realists.  
Whether the findings are due to counteracting emotions or decision errors is an open 
question. It could be that as optimism increases, disappointment eventually dominates the 
anticipatory feelings of expecting the best, so well-being starts to fall. For pessimists, the 
depressing effect of expecting doom (dread) may eventually dominate the elation when the 
worst is avoided. Also, plans based on inaccurate beliefs are bound to deliver worse outcomes 
than would rational expectations. At all events, our finding is that misperception of either 
sign is bad for well-being.  
Unrealistic optimism in the financial domain is a very specific instance of optimism, 
which raises the question whether our results would be different if we had data on unrealistic 
optimism in other domains. As unrealistic optimism tends to be greatest when outcomes are 
perceived to be under the individual’s control and can be influenced through effort or 
ingenuity, household finances seems likely to elicit high levels of unrealistic optimism. If 
optimism is domain-general, we would expect our financial measure to be correlated with 
unrealistic optimism in other settings in which the environment is fertile for eliciting bias in 
beliefs. To the extent this is the case, our procedure captures the well-being consequences of 
unrealistic optimism more generally. We are not aware of comparable data for unrealistic 
optimism over other activities, so we cannot conclusively distinguish whether our results 
arise because unrealistic optimism is domain-general, or that financial optimism contributes 
importantly to well-being but is unrelated with optimism in other contexts. 
Some evidence that our specific measure of financial optimism may capture a more 
domain-general bias is provided by de Meza, Dawson, Henley, and Arabsheibani (2019). 
Using the same data and optimism measure as here, financial optimism is found to be highly 
correlated with activities which are not directly financial but are plausibly influenced by 
optimism. In particular, financial optimists are more likely to smoke. The psychology here is 
that optimists tend to underestimate the occurrence of negative events such as illness and 
injury, leading to excessive participation in risky activities such as smoking whilst 
undertaking insufficient precautionary interventions.  
Despite the inclusion of many controls including personality factors, finding that 
holders of false beliefs have lower well-being does not ensure the relationship is causal. As 
we are concerned with the long-run comprehensive effects of an underlying and potentially 
unchanging misperception propensity, it is difficult to see that there is an alternative to an 
observational methodology. If there is a causal relationship, there is the issue of the direction 
of causality. One possibility is that feeling good makes people more positive about the future. 
The implication is that well-being is monotonically increasing in unrealistic optimism, which 
we do not find. A second version of reverse causality is that fewer stresses makes for more 
accurate forecasts. We investigated whether within-person changes to well-being increase the 
accuracy of expectations but find no evidence of this (see Figure S4 in the Supplemental 
Material).  
A further consideration is that optimism might be a (partially) self-fulfilling prophecy. 
If so, optimists have higher financial realizations than if their expectations were more 
realistic. Once this is taken into account, even if optimists suffer more disappointment, their 
well-being could be higher. As our procedure controls for realizations, only the 
disappointment is captured. It could therefore be falsely concluded that optimism depresses 
well-being. Excluding realizations as a control variable is not appropriate as well-being is 
directly affected by financial realizations which, as rational expectations predicts, are 
positively correlated with expectations. If unrealistic optimism does boost financial 
realizations, the only definite conclusion is that pessimism is worse for well-being than is 
realism. There is, however, reason to doubt that optimism affects performance. In 
experiments, Tenney, Logg, and Moore (2015) inter alia manipulate optimism but find no 
significant effect on performance. 
There is also the important question of the possibility of bias in the components of our 
optimism measure. For instance, when asked to judge a change in current financial status 
relative to a year ago, people may suffer recall bias. There is no problem if positive and 
negative events are recalled equally, but if negative events are more likely to deteriorate in 
the memory, financial improvements will be underestimated. The implication is that the level 
of expectations that maximise well-being occurs at a more pessimistic level than we report. 
Temporal self-appraisal theory (Wilson & Ross, 2001) has the opposite implication. Here, 
people may exaggerate any actual improvement by recalling the past as worse than it was, 
thereby enhancing their present selves by criticizing their past selves (Wilson & Ross, 2000, 
2001). If so, financial improvements will be overestimated, implying in our context that the 
expectations that maximise well-being are more optimistic than we conclude. Despite the 
possibility of bias in intertemporal comparisons the evidence suggests this is not very 
important in practice. According to Newby-Clark and Ross (2003) and Seidlitz and Diener 
(1993) there is little difference in people’s ability to recall both negative and positive events. 
More directly, in our data there is a strong match between individual’s intertemporal 
judgements of change in financial situation and the changes constructed from annually 
reported levels of household income (Brown & Taylor, 2006). This indicates recall bias of 
either type is not a problem. Finally, people may also show a bias in forecasting their future 
financial situation. However, this of course is the focus of our paper. 
A number of papers on counterfactual comparisons experimentally examine one 
aspect of mistaken beliefs, the tendency of optimists to experience disappointment when their 
expectations are dashed (Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & 
Ritov, 1997; Shepperd & McNulty, 2002). Sweeny and Shepperd (2010) also study 
disappointment but include a potential benefit of optimism, reduction of anticipatory negative 
affect. In their study, students are asked to forecast their exam result immediately before it is 
revealed. Affect is measured at time of forecast and when the result is disclosed. Here, the 
affective costs of positive expectations were found to outweigh the benefits, suggesting it is 
better to be pessimistic. However, measuring affect immediately before announcing results 
gives little opportunity to savour success. Measured a month earlier, optimists may be more 
relaxed than pessimists. Nonetheless, how do we reconcile these results with our finding that 
well-being is lower for both pessimists and optimists alike?   
In addressing this, it is important to recognize that unlike the studies mentioned 
above, our study is not specific to the momentary emotions associated with optimism, 
whether that be the anticipatory utility from positive expectations or the disappointment when 
outcomes fall short of expectations. That anticipatory utility exceeds disappointment (or the 
opposite) is not sufficient to conclude that optimism leads to greater (lower) well-being. For 
instance, well-being may depend on aspects of optimism not captured by its impact on 
emotions. Greater optimism may be associated with more accidents or inappropriate savings 
decisions. In the same way, pessimists may forego worthwhile opportunities or take excessive 
precautions. Indeed, Sweeny and Shepperd (2010) acknowledge that there may be other costs 
of pessimism not captured in their experiment. More than this, the well-being consequences 
of decision errors may in certain domains be momentary but in others take years to 
materialize. In a similar way, a current episode of disappointment may quickly evaporate or 
alternatively lead to serious longer-term problems such as chronic stress and depression 
(Brown & Harris, 2001). Our procedure takes all of these additional aspects of optimism into 
account, so answers the question of whether optimism is associated with higher well-being. 
Results can therefore differ considerably from studies that focus on the well-being 
consequences of a singular aspect of optimistic thinking.  
Although unrealistic optimism prevails in the population, according to our results, it is 
not a recipe for maximizing well-being. This might seem to pose an evolutionary puzzle, 
except that reproductive success not well-being is the “mission” of evolution. 
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Notes 
1 Many of these studies are based on the misconception that people who report that they are 
positive about their future are demonstrating a bias (see Colvin & Block, 1994; Weinstein & 
Klein, 1996). Some people are objectively more likely to experience good events and less 
likely to experience bad events. For example, Dunning and Story (1991) found that although 
depressed people have lower expectations then the non-depressed, their outcomes were even 
worse, so depressives emerged as more unrealistically optimistic than non-depressives. For 
optimism to be unrealistic, predictions need to be compared with later experiences or 
statistically derived true expected values (Coelho, 2010; Weinstein & Klein, 1996) as is done 
in our empirical analysis. 
2 The exception is if false beliefs influence others, as in Trivers (2000). 
3 The alternative to the three-point scale would be something like, “Please indicate your 
forecast of income change, where 0 = no change, 3 = highest positive change imaginable, and 
-3 = highest negative change imaginable”. This is problematic because whereas increase has 
an objective meaning, magnitude 2 is quite subjective. 
4 If there is misreporting but it is random this will not bias our coefficients. Even most 
versions of systematic bias would not affect the conclusion that there is a turning point of 
well-being with respect to beliefs. 
 
 
5 It is possible that an individual’s optimism may change in that the extent to which they 
systematically overestimate outcomes alters. There is no variable that directly captures this 
effect as a change in optimism in a given year may just reflect random variation in 
realizations or expectations. 
6 Equation (2) is obtained from Equation (1) by setting 𝑏ଵ = −𝑏ଶ and 𝑏ଷ = −𝑏ସ = 2𝑏ହ, 
restrictions which are not satisfied in the estimate of Equation (1). 
Tables 
 
Table 1. Second-Degree Polynomial Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions Measuring 
the Impact of Expectations and Realizations on Psychological Well-Being 
 
Dependent variable: GHQ Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
  95% CI   95% CI  
Predictors 𝑏 Low High 𝑡(df = 1565) 𝑏  Low High 𝑡(df = 1565) 
𝐸ത௜ -1.35  -2.22 -0.48 -3.05** 0.22  -0.01 0.45 1.84 
𝐸ത௜ଶ 2.66  1.12 4.20 3.39** -0.95  -1.36 -0.54 -4.56** 
𝑅ത௜ -0.88  -1.61 -0.15 -2.38* 0.44 0.25 0.64 4.47** 
𝑅ത௜ଶ 1.60  0.04 3.16 2.01* -0.42 -0.84 -0.01 -1.99* 
𝐸ത௜ × 𝑅ത௜ -4.18  -6.46 -1.91 -3.60** 0.86 0.26 1.47 2.79** 
F-test 5.02**   
 
8.75**    
R-squared 0.173   
 
0.195    
𝑁 1,601   
 
1,601    
Note: All regressions include a control variable for gender and a series of individual time-
averaged control variables for age (in linear form), marital status, the number of dependent 
children in the household, economic activity, educational attainment, housing tenure, logged 
monthly household income (deflated), number of cigarettes smoked and region of residence. 
Full results are available on request. CI = confidence interval. F-test is for the three second-
degree polynomial terms. 
∗ 𝑝 <  .05.  ∗∗ 𝑝 <  .01. 
 
  
Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions Measuring the Impact of Forecasting 
Errors on Psychological Well-Being 
  
Dependent variable: GHQ Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
  95% CI   95% CI  
Predictors 𝑏 Low High 𝑡(df = 1567) 𝑏  Low High 𝑡(df = 1567) 
𝐹𝐸തതതത௜ -1.16  -1.94 -0.37 -2.90** 0.09  -0.12 0.29 0.79 
𝐹𝐸തതതത௜ଶ 2.12  1.01 3.23 3.75** -0.54  -0.84 -0.25 -3.59** 
𝑅ത௜ -2.07  -2.68 -1.46 -6.66** 0.54 0.38 0.70 6.49** 
R-squared 0.172   
 
0.188    
𝑁 1,601   
 
1,601    
Note: All regressions include a control variable for gender and a series of individual time-
averaged control variables for age (in linear form), marital status, the number of dependent 
children in the household, economic activity, educational attainment, housing tenure, logged 
monthly household income (deflated), number of cigarettes smoked and region of residence. 
Full results are available on request. CI = confidence interval. 
∗ 𝑝 <  .05.  ∗∗ 𝑝 <  .01. 
 
  
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Contour map illustrating the predicted relationship between GHQ, expectations and 
realizations (Regression 1, Table 1). We use the thin-plate-spline interpolation method.  
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Figure 2. Contour map illustrating the predicted relationship between life satisfaction, 
expectations and realizations (Regression 2, Table 1). We use the thin-plate-spline 
interpolation method.  
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Figure 3. The quadratic relationship between expectations, forecast errors and psychological 
well-being. We also include as bar charts the slope estimates (derivative) of the quadratic 
relationships, with the 95% confidence intervals included. Top left (Regression 1, Table 1): 
the turning point of the quadratic prediction is 0.25, with a 95% confidence interval, or CI = 
[0.13, 0.38]. Top right (Regression 2, Table 1): the turning point of the quadratic prediction is 
0.11, with a 95% CI = [0.02, 0.21]. Bottom left (Regression 1, Table 2): the turning point of 
the quadratic prediction is 0.27, with a 95% CI = [0.12, 0.43]. Bottom right (Regression 2, 
Table 2): the turning point of the quadratic prediction is 0.08, with a 95% CI = [-0.09, 0.25]. 
All of these turning points and the respective 95% confidence intervals lie comfortably within 
the range of observable values in the data. 
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Supplemental Materials 
Table S1. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
GHQ 10.90 3.12 3.17 26.83 
Life Satisfaction 5.33 0.84 1.17 7.00 
Financial Expectations 0.13 0.31 -0.94 1.00 
Financial Realizations 0.01 0.31 -1.00 0.94 
Financial Forecast Error 0.12 0.28 -0.71 1.41 
Female 0.55  0 1 
Age (years) 47.64 13.84 23.50 88.50 
Employee 0.60  0.00 1.00 
Self-Employed 0.07  0.00 1.00 
Unemployed 0.02  0.00 0.72 
Full-time student 0.07  0.00 0.94 
Retired 0.19  0.00 1.00 
Economically inactive 0.04  0.00 1.00 
Single, never married 0.10  0.00 1.00 
Widowed/divorced/separated 0.11  0.00 1.00 
Married - partner employed 0.56  0.00 1.00 
Married - partner not 
employed 0.24  0.00 1.00 
Number of dependent 
children in the household 0.61 0.74 0.00 4.50 
University or college degree 0.13  0.00 1.00 
HND/HNC 0.08  0.00 1.00 
A-levels 0.19  0.00 1.00 
O-levels/GCSE’s 0.32  0.00 1.00 
No formal qualification 0.27  0.00 1.00 
Own house outright 0.30  0.00 1.00 
Own house with mortgage 0.55  0.00 1.00 
Rents house, private sector 0.05  0.00 1.00 
Rents house, social sector 0.10  0.00 1.00 
Log monthly household 
income (deflated) 7.74 0.54 5.88 9.33 
Number of cigarettes smoked 2.91 6.36 0.00 64.44 
𝑁 1,601    
Note: Summary statistics of individual time-averaged dependent and independent variables. 
Educational attainment is measured through a series of dummy variables indicating the highest 
level of attainment. These are: university or college degree level at undergraduate or 
postgraduate level; HND (Higher National Diplomas) and HNC (Higher National Certificates) 
which are work-related, or vocational, higher education qualifications; A-levels or equivalent 
(post-compulsory examinations taken at 18 as qualifying exams for college or university 
entrance); GCSE or O-levels (age 16 schooling attainment qualifications); and no formal 
qualifications. 
Table S2. Tests of Knife-Edge Specification. Second-Degree Polynomial Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions Measuring the Impact of 
Expectations and Realizations on Psychological Well-Being 
 
Dependent variable: GHQ  Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction  
 Regression 1  Regression 2  
  95% CI    95% CI   
Predictors 𝑏 Low High 𝑡 Stability 𝑏  Low High 𝑡 Stability 
𝐸ത௜ -1.39 -2.32 -0.45 -2.91** [100, 100] 0.20 -0.06 0.47 1.50 [99, 21] 
𝐸ത௜ଶ 2.69 1.08 4.30 3.27** [100, 100] -1.01 -1.45 -0.57 -4.50** [100, 100] 
𝑅ത௜ -0.94 -1.72 -0.16 -2.36* [100, 98] 0.44 0.23 0.64 4.22** [100, 100] 
𝑅ത௜ଶ 1.61 0.04 3.18 2.02* [100, 68] -0.47 -0.91 -0.04 -2.14* [100, 82] 
𝐸ത௜ × 𝑅ത௜ -4.49 -6.70 -2.28 -3.98** [100, 100] 1.01 0.38 1.63 3.15** [100, 100] 
𝑁 1,601   
 
 1,601     
Note: Control variables are gender and a series of individual time averaged control variables for age (in linear form), marital status, the number of 
dependent children in the household, economic activity, educational attainment, housing tenure, logged monthly household income (deflated), 
number of cigarettes smoked and region of residence. Following Young and Holsteen (2017), coefficients represent the mean coefficient estimate 
across all combinations of possible control variables. The procedure yields 1,024 unique combinations of control variables. Standard errors used 
in the calculations are the combined total of the average sampling and modelling standard error. Stability = sign stability (%) and statistical 
significance rate (%) for our coefficient estimates across the 1,024 unique combinations of control variables, with 𝑝 <  .05 being the threshold for 
statistical significance. For example, [100, 100] would indicate that with this list of possible control variables, it is not possible to find an opposite 
signed or even nonsignificant estimate. CI = confidence interval.  
∗ 𝑝 <  .05.  ∗∗ 𝑝 <  .01. 
 
 
 
  
Table S3. Tests of Knife-Edge Specification. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions Measuring the Impact of Forecasting Errors on 
Psychological Well-Being 
 
Dependent variable: GHQ  Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction  
 Regression 1  Regression 2  
  95% CI    95% CI   
Predictors 𝑏 Low High 𝑡 Stability 𝑏  Low High 𝑡 Stability 
𝐹𝐸തതതത௜ -1.21 -2.02 -0.40 -2.93** [100, 100] 0.07 -0.16 0.30 0.60 [88, 0] 
𝐹𝐸തതതത௜ଶ 2.22 1.14 3.30 4.02** [100, 100] -0.61 -0.92 -0.30 -3.84** [100, 100] 
𝑅ത௜ -2.18 -2.85 -1.51 -6.34** [100, 100] 0.52 0.30 0.73 4.70** [100, 100] 
𝑁 1,601   
 
 1,601     
Note: Control variables are gender and a series of individual time averaged control variables for age (in linear form), marital status, the number of 
dependent children in the household, economic activity, educational attainment, housing tenure, logged monthly household income (deflated), 
number of cigarettes smoked and region of residence. Following Young and Holsteen (2017), coefficients represent the mean coefficient estimate 
across all combinations of possible control variables. The procedure yields 1,024 unique combinations of control variables. Standard errors used 
in the calculations are the combined total of the average sampling and modelling standard error. Stability = sign stability (%) and statistical 
significance rate (%) for our coefficient estimates across the 1,024 unique combinations of control variables, with 𝑝 <  .05 being the threshold for 
statistical significance. For example, [100, 100] would indicate that with this list of possible control variables, it is not possible to find an opposite 
signed or even nonsignificant estimate. CI = confidence interval.  
∗ 𝑝 <  .05.  ∗∗ 𝑝 <  .01. 
 
  
Table S4. Controlling for the Big-Five. Second-Degree Polynomial Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions Measuring the Impact of 
Expectations and Realizations on Psychological Well-Being 
 
Dependent variable: GHQ Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
  95% CI   95% CI  
Predictors 𝑏 Low High 𝑡(df = 1559) 𝑏  Low High 𝑡(df = 1559) 
𝐸ത௜ -0.83 -1.58 -0.07 -2.15* 0.12 -0.10 0.33 1.08 
𝐸ത௜ଶ 2.23 0.88 3.57 3.25** -0.87 -1.24 -0.49 -4.51** 
𝑅ത௜ -0.99 -1.63 -0.36 -3.06** 0.46 0.28 0.63 5.02** 
𝑅ത௜ଶ 1.20 -0.16 2.56 1.73 -0.38 -0.76 0.00 -1.94 
𝐸ത௜ × 𝑅ത௜ -2.94 -4.92 -0.95 -2.90** 0.65 0.10 1.21 2.31* 
Conscientiousness -0.20 -0.33 -0.06 -2.91** 0.10 0.06 0.13 5.02** 
Extraversion -0.05 -0.17 0.07 -0.85 0.06 0.03 0.09 3.53** 
Agreeableness 0.04 -0.10 0.18 0.57 0.06 0.02 0.10 2.88** 
Openness 0.04 -0.08 0.17 0.69 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.77 
Neuroticism 1.16 1.05 1.26 21.08** -0.20 -0.23 -0.17 -12.90** 
F-test 4.09**    9.86**    
R-squared 0.378    0.330    
𝑁 1,600   
 
1,600    
Note: Personality traits - conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, openness, neuroticism – are measured using the short 15-item Big-Five 
inventory (BFI-15). Each trait is based on a level of agreement with three statements, assessed on a seven-point scale. Response are added across 
each set of the three statements and then divided by the number of items over which the sum is calculated. All regressions include a control variable 
for gender and a series of individual time-averaged control variables for age (in linear form), marital status, the number of dependent children in 
the household, economic activity, educational attainment, housing tenure, logged monthly household income (deflated), number of cigarettes 
smoked and region of residence. Full results are available on request. CI = confidence interval. F-test is for the three second-degree polynomial 
terms. 
∗ 𝑝 <  .05.  ∗∗ 𝑝 <  .01. 
  
Table S5. Controlling for the Big-Five. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions Measuring the Impact of Forecasting Errors on 
Psychological Well-Being 
  
Dependent variable: GHQ Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
  95% CI   95% CI  
Predictors 𝑏 Low High 𝑡(df = 1561) 𝑏  Low High 𝑡(df = 1561) 
𝐹𝐸തതതത௜ -0.61 -1.30 0.07 -1.76 -0.01 -0.20 0.18 -0.12 
𝐹𝐸തതതത௜ଶ 1.58 0.61 2.55 3.19** -0.45 -0.73 -0.18 -3.25** 
𝑅ത௜ -1.63 -2.16 -1.10 -6.01** 0.45 0.30 0.60 5.95** 
Conscientiousness -0.20 -0.34 -0.07 -2.93** 0.10 0.06 0.14 5.04** 
Extraversion -0.05 -0.17 0.07 -0.86 0.06 0.03 0.09 3.52** 
Agreeableness 0.04 -0.10 0.18 0.53 0.06 0.02 0.10 2.99** 
Openness 0.05 -0.07 0.17 0.80 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -1.07 
Neuroticism 1.15 1.05 1.26 21.05** -0.20 -0.23 -0.17 -12.70** 
R-squared 0.377    0.322    
𝑁 1,600   
 
1,600    
Note: Personality traits - conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, openness, neuroticism – are measured using the short 15-item Big-Five 
inventory (BFI-15). Each trait is based on a level of agreement with three statements, assessed on a seven-point scale. Response are added across 
each set of the three statements and then divided by the number of items over which the sum is calculated. All regressions include a control variable 
for gender and a series of individual time-averaged control variables for age (in linear form), marital status, the number of dependent children in 
the household, economic activity, educational attainment, housing tenure, logged monthly household income (deflated), number of cigarettes 
smoked and region of residence. Full results are available on request. CI = confidence interval.  
∗ 𝑝 <  .05.  ∗∗ 𝑝 <  .01. 
 
 
  
Figure S1. Scatterplot of expectations and realizations. The 45-degree line represents the 
equality of expectations and realizations. 
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 Figure S2. Histogram of GHQ and life satisfaction.  
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Figure S3. Controlling for the Big-Five. The quadratic relationship between expectations, 
forecast errors and psychological well-being. We also include as bar charts the slope estimates 
(derivative) of the quadratic relationships, with the 95% confidence intervals included. Top left 
(Regression 1, Table S4): the turning point of the quadratic prediction is 0.19, with a 95% 
confidence interval, or CI = [0.06, 0.31]. Top right (Regression 2, Table S4): the turning point 
of the quadratic prediction is 0.07, with a 95% CI = [-0.04, 0.17]. Bottom left (Regression 1, 
Table S5): the turning point of the quadratic prediction is 0.19, with a 95% CI = [0.02, 0.37]. 
Bottom right (Regression 2, Table S5): the turning point of the quadratic prediction is -0.01, 
with a 95% CI = [-0.23, 0.21]. All of these turning points and the respective 95% confidence 
intervals lie comfortably within the range of observable values in the data. 
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Does well-being determine forecast accuracy? 
The “precision hypothesis” is that fewer stresses enable clearer, more accurate forecasts. In 
that case it is well-being that determines optimism and not the reverse.  
 
To investigate whether this effect is present, we performed a within-person analysis of whether 
changes to an individuals’ psychological well-being influenced the accuracy of their financial 
expectations. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
The sample used for the subsequent analysis is restricted to the original BHPS sample 
covering Great Britain and to individuals who were observed in all 18 waves and gave valid 
responses to the dependent and independent variables used in the subsequent analysis. This 
yields a balanced panel of 1,601 individuals. 
 
 Analytic Strategy 
 
Using within-person variation we formally estimate whether changes to an individuals’ 
psychological well-being influenced the accuracy of financial expectations. We used a 
correlated random-effects ordered probit model, following Mundlak (1978) and Wooldridge 
(2005).  Here, the dependent variable is our ordinal financial realization variable (𝑅௜௧ା ), 
measured for individual, 𝑖, at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 + 1. The predictor variables include our ordinal financial 
expectations variable measured at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 (𝐸௜௧), psychological well-being at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 (𝑊௜௧
௝) for 
well-being measure 𝑗 = (𝐺𝐻𝑄, 𝐿𝑆) and the interaction of these two predictor variables. We 
input GHQ into the equation in linear form whereas life satisfaction is treated as an ordinal 
variable. Specifically, we estimated the following fixed-effects equation via an ordered probit 
correlated random-effects approach (to simplify, we omitted all control variables from the 
notation):      
 
𝑅௜௧ାଵ = 𝑏଴ + 𝑏ଵ𝐸௜௧ + 𝑏ଶ𝑊௜௧
௝ + 𝑏ଷ൫𝐸௜௧ × 𝑊௜௧
௝൯ + 𝛼௜ + 𝑒௜௧ 
 
As usual,  α୧ is an unobservable individual-specific effect and 𝑒୧୲ is the idiosyncratic error term 
which picks up the effect of time-varying unobservable determinants. In the equation, we 
control for a range of individual time-varying socioeconomic and sociodemographic controls. 
These control variables are: age (in linear form); marital status; the number of dependent 
children in the household; economic activity; educational attainment; housing tenure; logged 
monthly household income (deflated); number of cigarettes smoked and region of residence. 
 
 
Results 
 
The key results of this equation are summarized in Figure S4 were we plot the predicted 
probabilities of each financial realization at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 + 1, for every combination of financial 
expectation and psychological well-being status at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡. If an individual’s financial 
expectations are more random when their psychological well-being is low, the forecast will be 
less likely to be correct. In fact, changes to psychological well-being have a negligible 
influence on the probability of forecast accuracy as is illustrated in Figure S4. Figure S4 also 
clearly illustrates that financial expectations are in part rational as the probability of a given 
realization at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 + 1 is highest for the matching expectation at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡. However, changes 
to individual well-being do not increase or decrease the likelihood that expectations will be 
fulfilled.  
 
 
 
Figure S4. The predicted probability of financial realizations at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 + 1, for every 
combination of financial expectation and psychological well-being status at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡. Error bars 
illustrate the 95% confidence intervals of the predictions. 
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